random observations on the destruction of date palms

the anglo-american assault on iraq is bound to complicate international relations on many levels. this includes the multilateral trade negotiations occurring under wto auspices. dr. supachai has already commented on the difficulties occurring in the negotiations on agriculture, and has noted that the hostilities against iraq endanger progress on the global trade agenda.

although the leading players were able to push the doha round on a reluctant world in the aftermath of the september 2001 terror attacks on us soil, there has been little evidence of strong commitment to the process. it appears that the negotiations are increasingly subject to a bleed-through from the global politico-military situation. in other words, non-trade concerns are a growing source of obstruction in the negotiations. chief among these are perceptions of national security in the face of emerging unconventional threats to peace and prosperity.

ironically, the islamic conference has declared that the international trading system is prejudicial to their development interests, implying that the wto-centred regime has a systemic bias, which makes it part of the problem rather than part of the solution. this is entirely consistent with the views of many developing countries, such as the african national congress, and the non-aligned movement.

decapitation, then dismemberment

taking out the iraqi leadership is proving to be rather difficult. even more challenging however will be maintaining the state of iraq in the post-saddam period. bearing in mind that iraq has existed only since 1932, that the shi'ite muslim population is predisposed to align with iran, and that us strategic interests will be better served by dismemberment, the chances that the territorial integrity of iraq will survive the conflict are low.

command and control: the power of quadrants

the onset of conflict in iraq was preceded by a us military assessment that suggested the iraqi government would collapse quickly if the command and control apparatus were destroyed in the initial assault. however, into the second week of the fight, the iraqi government is still able to broadcast freely on the state television network, and the leadership is largely intact despite aggressive bombardment of known residences and office buildings. general franks is correct to observe there is degradation in iraqi command and control capacity. however, the division of both the country and baghdad into four quadrants implies a distributed command and control system designed to overcome the vulnerabilities of a centralised structure around a single leader. in other words, saddam may be paranoid, but he's not crazy.

the quadrant strategy has also ensured that iraqi forces - including regulars - are less likely to cut and run in the face of fire or surrender without a fight. in short, insufficient attention was paid in the planning stages to the iraqi counterforce strategy. it was assumed in other words, that the single greatest threat was the unleashing of chemical weapons in a final thrust on baghdad before certain defeat for the regime. now it appears that hit and run guerrilla tactics, paramilitary forces, and unconventional urban warfare are going to grind down morale as coalition casualties mount in, as it was described by the commander of uk forces in the gulf, air marshal brian burridge, this "most ambiguous battle space."

paramilitary players

a major source of ambiguity is the unconventional behaviour of the saddam fedayeen. its missions include running counterinsurgency operations, and aiding police maintain order. a quasi-official force controlled by saddam's eldest son, uday, the key role being played by the saddam fedayeen is an example of underestimation on the part of the coalition. saddam fedayeen means "saddam's men of sacrifice" and they are proving to be a crafty foe.

prior to conflict, estimates of size varied widely between 10,000 and 40,000 soldiers recruited from areas that are loyal to saddam. since march 20, unofficial pentagon estimates suggest the group is about 30,000 strong in southern iraq alone. these forces are the core resistance in basra, and are the major backbone in the continuing strength displayed at an-nasiriyah. their presence in such numbers in southern iraq appears to have been overlooked - or not known - prior to the commencement of hostilities. this has significantly complicated the timing for assembling a large force at the gates of baghdad.

shi'ite uprisings

during the march 25 centcom briefing in doha, major general victor renuart, us central command, spoke of the strategy to collapse the saddam hussein regime as "quick and synergistic". a reporter asked him whether the shi'ite were less disposed to fight than had been assumed in the pre-conflict planning. coalition planners had been hoping the shi'ite south would welcome the invasion. in other words, the expected uprising in the south had failed to materialise.

general renuart answered by saying, "no, i don't think so." the vast majority of shi'ite, he said, have been oppressed by the regime, and still feel threatened by saddam's forces. as the regime's forces are neutralised, they will come around very quickly. another interesting perspective being offered by some us media outlets is that there is no uprising because the us (in conjunction with iran) has not approved such an act by the shi'ite. the lack of a credible interpretation smacks of a crucial flaw in operational strategy preventing rapid closure to the campaign.

next up: free kurdistan

since the gulf war in 1991, references have always been to the kurds who occupy the no-fly zone of northern iraq. last week, for the first time, the area was referred to as "iraqi kurdistan". this signalled to the world the most likely nature of the agreement between the us and the kurds.

in an afp story datelined baghdad on march 25 2003, the language morphs again: "turkish and us officials meanwhile met for a second day of difficult talks on the explosive issue of turkish troops entering iraqi-controlled kurdistan." clearly, the turkish government will not easily accept the presence of an autonomous kurdistan on its border, representing a potential provocation in relation to its own population of kurds in eastern turkey.

the apparent intention of the turkish government to inject turkish armed forces into north-eastern iraq is based on the pretence that following the gulf war in 1991, the area became a hotbed of terrorist activity threatening the integrity of the turkish state. we are now close to open conflict between iraqi kurds and the turkish armed forces. if kurd-turk hostilities are imminent, the us led coalition will find itself necessarily acting as a buffer to avoid the break out of open conflict between two allies. this could not only delay an advance on baghdad from the north, but also complicate the extrication of us forces from the region in post-saddam iraq.

significantly, it is also likely to add further tension in the us-eu relationship. turkey is a candidate for membership in the eu, and one would expect that brussels will eventually tilt toward ankara on the kurdish question.

the storms of god

"the whole world is with us now, even the weather, because the sandstorm has brought benefits to us. they are the storms of god." -- baghdad truck driver ahmed falah

iraq has hot dry weather in summer when mean minimum temperatures range from about 22.2� c to about 29� c and rise to maximums between roughly 37.7� c and 43.3� c. temperatures sometimes go over 46� c in the summer months, and several stations have records of over 48� c.

the summer months also feature two kinds of wind phenomena. the southern and southeasterly sharqi, a dry, dusty wind with occasional gusts of eighty kilometres an hour, occurs from april to early june, and again from late september through november. it may last for a day at the beginning and end of the season but for several days at other times. this wind is often accompanied by violent dust storms that may rise to heights of several thousand meters and close airports for brief periods.

from mid-june to mid-september the prevailing wind, called the shamal, is from the north and northwest. it is a steady wind, absent only occasionally during this period. the very dry air brought by the shamal permits intensive sun heating of the land surface, though the breeze has some modest cooling effect.

in other words, the climate in the march to november period is crowded with dust and sand storm events that will obstruct coalition progress. for example, we know from the 1991 gulf war experience that sandstorms can cut visibility to almost zero and force dust into high-tech equipment. it also cuts the efficiency of us thermal imaging gear that allows troops to see the heat signature of the bodies of iraqi forces in the dark.

however, the storm threat goes far beyond its impact on technology and equipment. a very interesting document titled global alarm: dust and sandstorms from the world's drylands, was issued by the secretariat of the united nations convention to combat desertification (unccd) in august 2001. chapter 9 is called "combating desertification and sandstorms in iraq." the chapter includes climatic observations of vital importance to ground and air operations in iraq:

• varying degrees of precipitation, from 1,200 mm in the north to less than 100 mm in the south. throughout the whole of iraq the rainy season is from march-november. daily evaporation (etp) rates vary from 1.5 mm in the winter months, reaching their peak during the summer months with a value of 9.0 mm. the total annual etp from a free water surface is around 2,000 mm.
• northerly and northwesterly winds that sweep the country during the dry months, where wind velocity may exceed 100 km/hr, raising dust storms.
• wind speeds may reach their maximum by midday in july (average 3.3 m/s). the measured threshold velocity for the movement of soil and sediment particles is 3.0 m/sec.
• dust storms occur more frequently during spring and autumn, with an average of 20 days per year.

these conditions will have a negative impact on coalition operations, at the least in slowing down the campaign and increasing vulnerability to surprise attacks.

in terms of ground mobility, the study notes that,

"creeping sands can have detrimental effects on some inter-city highway sections by hindering traffic flow, causing road accidents, and increasing maintenance costs. the sand emanates from wind erosion of the topsoil, a result of degradation of the natural plant cover caused by local overgrazing and intensive cultivation."

significantly, the highway sections affected include the following:

1. sections between the diwaniyah and nasseriyah cities, measuring more than 50 km.
2. sections between al-nasiriyah and al-basra, measuring more than 30 km.
3. sections between ramady town and the syrian-iraqi border, namely the 110-160 km and the 210-450 km sections in the direction of the jordanian and syrian borders for a distance of more than 20 km.

among the main roads and feeder roads that are particularly badly affected by sand dune encroachment:

1. al-nadsiriyah to al-basra road in the tallahm area.
2. kut-imara road in the eastern ali region.
3. ramady-rutba road (old road), between the 100m km and 140 km pegs.
4. fajr-al bdir road.
5. tikrit-tuz road.
6. shomely-numania road.
7. maimona - al-rifaei road.

the volume of sand shifted from the affected roads reached 180,000 cubic m in one year, which gives a good indication of the effort required to maintain the roads in peacetime. in short, forward mobility to baghdad, as well as effective control in the south will all be adversely affected by intermittent rain, sand, and dust storms over the coming months. this will impact not only rapid troop deployment and re-deployment, but also distribution of humanitarian aid across the country.

friendly fire

almost immediately, fratricide or friendly fire began to emerge as a combat challenge for the coalition. we have not heard the last of friendly fire casualties in iraq. this is of course not a new phenomenon, but it remains an understudied one. for operation desert storm, the us department of defense provides friendly fire statistics of 15% wounded in action, and 24% killed in action (35 of 148).

although the expected and generally accepted rate of fratricide is 2 per cent, there is debate over the validity of that estimate. kenneth k. steinweg, in his article dealing realistically with fratricide, which appeared in parameters, spring 1995, offers an overview of the issues surrounding friendly fire. no single weapon system is dominant. fratricide occurs across the spectrum of weapons, including artillery, mortar, rifle, and close air support. generally, case studies of military actions suggest the rate falls between 10 and 20 percent, with a likely average fratricide rate of 14 percent for killed and wounded in action. in studies since 1985, the us army training and doctrine command (tradoc) definition is widely employed.

to illustrate the enormous effect that combat stress has on human perception, the kiska case is often cited. expecting tough japanese resistance, 35,000 us and canadian troops invaded kiska, an aleutian island, in august 1943. the daylight assault was complicated by dense fog. combat operations continued through the night. by the end of the fight a day later, 28 men were dead and 50 were wounded. there were no japanese on the island. this "battle" continued for 24 hours against an enemy who wasn't there. thus 100 percent of the casualties were fratricide. steinweg writes that the "miscalculation, misidentification, and error in this assault clearly exemplify what the conditions of combat, fear, and uncertainty can do to judgment. the kiska island experience suggests that fratricide rates five or more times higher than the often-cited two percent are both understandable and reasonable in difficult, long running combat operations."

date palms

one of the most vivid recollections of my life in baghdad is the glorious date palms. they were the most delicious dates i have ever eaten. they were on and near the property, but really they were common in most areas of the city. right behind our home in shalidshiya, there was a small village where the women every day made flat bread in the communal oven. i wonder what has become of their sons and daughters, of my young dear friends of long ago.

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